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Abstract
Since the seminal paper written by Weitzman (1974), the “prices vs. quantities” debate
regarding choice of policy instrument under imperfect information and uncertainty has been
an ongoing concern for economists, especially in the ﬁeld of the environment. In this debate,
several papers have recommended that the regulator allow pollution victims (citizens) to
participate in tradable permits markets. According to this literature, when pollution victims
purchase and withhold (i.e. destroy) emission rights from polluting ﬁrms, this means that the
overall quota is not eﬃcient and that welfare gains will be realised. In this paper, we present
further theoretical results showing that citizen participation in tradable quotas markets may
become welfare decreasing. Indeed, citizens can aggravate the ﬁrst error made by the regulator
if they are also under uncertainty about the marginal beneﬁt curve or if they exhibit strong
enough risk aversion. Therefore, we recommend that the regulator limit citizen participation
to a certain percentage of permits. In doing so, we extend the “prices versus quantities”
debate to simultaneous uncertainty and risk aversion by showing that a marketable permits
system oﬀers the regulator an opportunity to control the negative eﬀects of agents’ (citizens’
and ﬁrms’) risk aversion on welfare.
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11 Introduction
Since the seminal paper written by Weitzman (1974), the “prices vs. quantities” debate
regarding choice of policy instrument under imperfect information and uncertainty has been
an ongoing concern for economists, especially in the ﬁeld of the environment. In the presence
of signiﬁcant uncertainty about the beneﬁts and costs of environmental protection, the “prices
vs. quantities” literature establishes the conditions under which price-based environmental
regulation (emission tax) or quantity-based environmental regulation (command-and-control
or tradable permits1) is the preferred policy. The main ﬁnding is that expected welfare gains
generated by both instruments depend on the relative slopes of the aggregate functions of
marginal pollution abatement cost and marginal beneﬁt of pollution control2.
In this debate, one of the latest theoretical reﬁnements is to include the victims of pollution
(or environmental groups), hereinafter referred to as “citizens”, in the tradable permits mar-
ket. It should be noted that this policy recommendation of including pollution victims in
pollution permits markets was ﬁrst developed by Dales (1968) but did not attract attention
until Shrestha (1998). According to this article, if the pollution level deﬁned by the regulator
under uncertainty exceeds the optimal pollution level, then citizen participation in pollution
permits market is a means of reaching the optimal pollution level by purchasing and retiring
“bad” permits from the market. Following Shrestha, several papers have considered the par-
ticipation of pollution victims in the trading process (Ahlmein and Schneider 2002; Smith and
Yates 2003a,b; Malueg and Yates 2006; English and Yates 2007; Israel 2007; Rousse 2008). As
a whole, these papers conﬁrm Shrestha’s ﬁndings in concluding that citizen participation in
emissions trading should not be prevented. They suggest that when non-polluting agents buy
and destroy permits, this means that the overall quota is not eﬃcient and therefore welfare
gains will be realised.
In practice, regulators follow this policy recommendation and generally allow any artiﬁcial or
natural person to access the emissions markets (SO2 Acid Rain Program, RECLAIM Program,
European Union CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme3). At present, citizens are not proactively
participating in emissions trading4, probably due of high transaction costs and being unaware
of this opportunity rather than because optimal levels of pollution have been set by regu-
lators. But as the demand of individuals wishing to take part in the environmental policy
grows (Brewer 2005) and utilization of market mechanisms for the purpose of environmental
protection becomes increasingly accepted, especially in the ﬁght against climate change with
the recent success of carbon oﬀsetting5, citizen participation in pollution permits markets ap-
pears to be the next step towards a more participative environmental policy. Indeed, public
participation in decision-making is now a commonly stated objective across most sectors of
environmental policy (Few et al. 2007), and citizen participation in emissions trading (market
participation) implies a higher degree of active involvement in taking decision than tradi-
tional (non-market) forms of public participation (forming interest groups, demonstrating,
lobbying).
2In this paper, we present further ﬁndings on the theoretical justiﬁcation of citizen participa-
tion in emissions trading and show that Shrestha’s proposition does not necessarily hold, for
two reasons. First, in practice, citizens are generally not better informed than the benevo-
lent regulator about the marginal beneﬁt curve. Second, because of the uncertainty citizens
are faced with, it is reasonable to assume that they may exhibit risk aversion, for instance,
regarding the benevolent nature of the regulator or simply regarding the severity of the envi-
ronmental and economic eﬀects of pollution. In these theoretical frameworks, we show that
citizen participation in pollution permits market can either increase or decrease the level of
welfare. As the eﬀects of risk aversion in the “prices versus quantities” literature were only
addressed by Adar and Griﬃn (1976) at the polluters’ level, our analysis also contributes
to this debate by considering the case in which both ﬁrms and citizens are risk averse. In
this theoretical setting, a marketable permits system will again prove superior to an emission
tax because the negative eﬀects of agents’ risk aversion on welfare can be controlled by the
regulator through the choice of an emission permits market.
Our paper is set out as follows. In the ﬁrst instance, we review the necessary background
for our discussion, i.e. the main conclusions of the prices versus quantities debate when
uncertainty is only at the agency level. We then relax the general assumption of perfectly
informed and risk neutral citizens. In the second instance, we consider the fact that there
is also uncertainty at the citizen level; and in the third instance, we examine the eﬀects of
citizens’ risk aversion on permit purchasing and withholding behaviour. Finally, we conclude
our paper with some policy recommendations.
2 Previous literature
The pollution control agency faces signiﬁcant uncertainties regarding both the costs and ben-
eﬁts of environmental protection. Concerning costs, we can say that pollution control tech-
nology is continuously improving (through innovation, economies of scale or learning-curve
phenomena), technology diﬀusion rates are uncertain and future input prices are unknown.
As a consequence, the regulator faces uncertainties about individual ﬁrms’ marginal cost
functions and by extension the aggregate marginal cost function. On the other hand, the
environmental protection agency also faces uncertainties about the marginal beneﬁt function.
Indeed, the standard error attached to the marginal beneﬁt function is signiﬁcant because
environmental eﬀects of pollution are generally not well-known, economic eﬀects of pollution
(for example on health or land use) are hard to evaluate, and for a given level of pollution,
particular weather conditions (high temperature, wind speed, precipitation, etc.) occurring
stochastically can have a non-uniform impact on the environmental and economic eﬀects of
pollution.
Because of these uncertainties, the regulator is obliged to select an environmental policy
knowing that he will make errors. Thus, any environmental policy in the face of uncertainty
3aims at maximizing expected welfare. In the standard analysis, we assume situations where
there is only beneﬁt uncertainty or only cost uncertainty. According to the works of Weitzman
(1974), Adar and Griﬃn (1976) or even Baumol and Oates (1988), the risk neutral regulator
chooses the less welfare decreasing instrument according to the relative marginal cost and
marginal beneﬁt function slopes. Indeed, with linear approximations of marginal beneﬁt and
marginal cost functions6, Weitzman has established that the comparative advantage of a
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where Δp/q is the net welfare advantage of a price instrument over a quantity instrument, σ2
C
is the variance of costs, C   > 0 is the slope of the marginal cost function, B   < 0i st h es l o p e
of the marginal beneﬁt function (≈ refers to an accurate local approximation in the traditional
Taylor theorem sense). In order to interpret this result, we generally refer to the graphical
representations proposed by Adar and Griﬃn (1976) where MC is used for marginal cost,
MB for marginal beneﬁt, subscript E for expected (anticipated, hypothesized) and subscript
R for real (realised, actual, true).
Firstly, when there is complete certainty concerning cost, the standard analysis concludes
that beneﬁt uncertainty has no eﬀect on eﬃcient instrument choice: if σ2
C =0t h e nΔ p/q ≈ 0.
This situation is depicted in ﬁgure 1 where MCR is known with certainty. When there is
only beneﬁt uncertainty, both instruments achieve the same emission level (QE) and, as a
consequence, the same welfare loss (area ABC) compared to the eﬃcient emission level Q∗.
Secondly, when there is only cost uncertainty, we have to look at the marginal cost and
marginal beneﬁt functions slopes. The price instrument is to be favoured (Δp/q > 0) when
|B  | < |C  |, and the quantity instrument is to be favoured (Δp/q < 0) when |B  | > |C  |.T h i s
latter case is depicted in ﬁgure 2 where MBR is known with certainty and the welfare loss
under a price instrument is higher than the welfare loss under a quantity instrument (area
ABC > area ADE). The intuition behind this is that when the marginal beneﬁt function is
steep, i.e. if there are environmental thresholds above which a small increase of emissions
can generate highly signiﬁcant impacts on the environment, it is very important to control
quantities strictly in order to ensure that emissions do not exceed the critical level. In the
other case, if the slope of the marginal cost is higher than the slope of the marginal beneﬁt,
this means that marginal cost will become increasingly high with respect to the damage that
is being prevented. In these conditions, price-based regulation is to be favoured compared to
quantity-based regulation because if an excessively strict ceiling is determined for quantities,
this may generate excessively high constraints for regulated ﬁrms.
Leaving aside the standard analysis, let us consider that the regulator faces both cost and
beneﬁt uncertainty. The equation corresponding to this situation was provided in a footnote
by Weitzman (1974) and re-examined later by Stavins (1996). In this simultaneous uncertainty
scenario, the choice of policy instruments depends on the slope of the two marginal functions,
4but also on their correlation. The comparative advantage of a price instrument over a quantity




















BC is the covariance of beneﬁts and costs, σB and σC are the standard deviation of
beneﬁts and costs respectively, and ρBC is the coeﬃcient of correlation between beneﬁts and
costs.
Based on this equation, we can make the following observations. First, when there is a
correlation between beneﬁts and costs (ρBC  = 0), beneﬁt uncertainty has some eﬀect on
instrument choice7. Second, a negative correlation between beneﬁts and costs (ρBC < 0)
tends to favour the price instrument. Third, a positive correlation between beneﬁts and
costs (ρBC > 0) tends to favour the quantity instrument. Fourth, for particular values of
diﬀerent parameters, the results obtained under the standard analysis can be reversed. The
probability that the right hand side of the equation may change the sign of the left hand side of
the equation is greater when the correlation between beneﬁts and costs is strong, the degrees
of beneﬁts and costs uncertainty are high and the marginal beneﬁt function is ﬂat. In ﬁgure 3,
we give an example of an overwhelming result in favour of the quantity instrument where the
marginal cost function is steeper than the marginal beneﬁt function (but remains relatively
ﬂat) and there is a positive correlation between beneﬁts and costs (the two realised functions
shift in the same direction). In this case of simultaneous uncertainty, the welfare loss under a
price instrument is higher than the welfare loss under a quantity instrument (area ABC > area
ADE). Fifth, Stavins carries out a simple sensitivity analysis to explore the consequences for
eﬃcient instrument choice with plausible values of the relevant parameters (B  /C  , ρBC and
σB/σC). He shows that the usual policy instrument choice based upon relative slopes alone
is less likely to be reversed in the case of conventional identiﬁcation of a quantity instrument
than in the case of conventional identiﬁcation of a price instrument. Finally, Stavins argues
that in practice, cases of positive correlations between marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs
are general, suggesting that quantity instruments would be more attractive than otherwise.
This tendency in favour of the use of a quantity instrument is also an underlying conclusion
in the works of Adar and Griﬃn (1976) and Shrestha (1998).
At the end of their paper, Adar and Griﬃn (1976) analyse the consequences of uncertainty
and risk aversion at the ﬁrm level. In compliance with the theory of the competitive ﬁrm
under price uncertainty (Sandmo 1971), they ﬁnd that the risk averse ﬁrm will not operate
as under risk neutrality where its expected marginal cost equals the expected price. Under
quantity regulation, when the price of permits is uncertain, the risk averse ﬁrm will produce
the output where the expected price is above marginal costs: E (˜ p) >C   (Q), with ˜ p being
a random variable. Under price regulation, when marginal costs are stochastic, the risk
averse ﬁrm will operate where the expected marginal cost is less than the price of the tax:
pT >E[C  (Q, ˜ η)], with ˜ η being a random variable. On the basis of these results, we can say
5that under quantity regulation, the welfare loss remains the same. On the contrary, under
price regulation, risk aversion results in less emission reduction and thus leads to a welfare loss
change. This eﬀect is depicted in ﬁgure 3 where the marginal cost curve MCF,r e p r e s e n t i n g
the ﬁrm’s behaviour, shifts to the left of the regulator’s expected marginal cost function which
describes the relevant expected social cost for the risk averse ﬁrm. So under a price instrument
we reach a lower abatement level (QF <Q E) and an altered welfare loss that can become
very signiﬁcant depending on the degree of risk aversion (area AHI > area ABC). In other
words, the regulator should take risk aversion among ﬁrms into account when choosing a price
regulation.
Shrestha (1998) also shows in a diﬀerent way that a pollution permits market has a certain
advantage over an emission tax. She argues that the consequences of the regulator’s assessment
errors when determining the overall quota can be limited by revealing the preferences of
pollution victims. Theoretically, when marginal pollution damage exceeds marginal pollution
abatement cost, citizens will participate in emissions trading, i.e. they will purchase and
withhold (i.e. destroy) emission permits from polluting ﬁrms until the optimal pollution level
is reached8. For example in ﬁgure 1, citizen participation allows the optimal level of pollution
(Q∗) to be attained by purchasing and retiring a certain number of QE − Q∗ permits from
the market. In the conventional analysis, it seems that a tradable emission permits system is
to be preferred except when the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal
beneﬁt curve and when its realised position is higher than its expected position.
In the following, we show that citizen participation in emissions trading can in some circum-
stances lead to higher welfare loss than the absence of citizen participation. Our argument
is that the underlying assumptions in previous literature of well-informed and risk neutral
citizens are unrealistic. Therefore, we consider in the ﬁrst instance that on the whole, citizens
are under uncertainty about the beneﬁts of pollution control, and in the second instance, that
citizens can also exhibit risk aversion. We thus extend the “prices versus quantities” debate
to the case of simultaneous uncertainty and risk averse agents (ﬁrms and citizens).
3 Uncertainty at the citizen level
Our argument is that Shrestha (1998) and others make a misplaced assumption concerning
the timing of uncertainty resolution and the information that citizens have at their disposal.
Shrestha argues that when the environmental target is too lenient, the simple revelation
of citizens’ preferences for the environment is enough to attain the optimal pollution level.
Furthermore, the increasing number of players in the tradable permits market improves com-
petition, as anticompetitive behaviours (market power) from citizens seem improbable9.T h i s
theory sounds like good news for regulators because if it is true they would simply need to
set a deliberately low environmental target and wait for citizens to purchase and destroy bad
6permits. Unfortunately, this argument is not suﬃcient. Firstly, citizens can adopt strate-
gic behaviours, i.e. they can free ride by leaving other people to control pollution (Ahlmein
and Schneider 2002; Smith and Yates 2003a,b). Secondly, the situation that Hardin (1968)
has called “tragedy of the commons” must not arise; i.e. victims of pollution must not be
discouraged by the assumed insigniﬁcance of their individual actions to reduce the pollution
level (Ahlmein and Schneider 2002). Thirdly, high transaction costs can discourage citizens
from participating in the trading process (Israel 2007; Rousse 2008). Indeed, in practice,
access to these markets is diﬃcult because emissions markets are insiders’ markets. On these
speciﬁc markets, emissions are not as easy to trade as, for example, quoted shares on equity
markets10. These three remarks reduce the scope of this policy recommendation but do not
mean that regulators must prohibit citizen participation in emissions trading since a small
degree of participation can always improve welfare.
On the contrary, we believe that citizen participation can become damaging for welfare if we
consider that pollution victims can buy and retire too many permits. The possibility that
citizens can over reduce pollution has only been considered by Ahlmein and Schneider (2002)
and Israel (2007). They mention that agents’ preferences can be biased by impurely altruistic
behaviours. This concept was introduced for the ﬁrst time in the economic literature by
Andreoni (1989, 1990). In our context, it means that individuals could retire permits in order
to feel better by acting as conscientious citizens. The authors indicate that impurely altruistic
behaviours should be relatively insigniﬁcant and can in part compensate the problems of the
commons and of free riding. Thus, they conclude that the regulator should allow citizens to
purchase and retire as many pollution permits as they wish.
Our argument is quite similar to the outcome of impurely altruist behaviours but we believe
that signiﬁcance of these combined potential negative eﬀects can be high enough to recom-
mend that the regulator restrict citizen participation in pollution permits markets to a certain
number of quotas. Indeed, it is hard to believe that citizens have the correct information about
the position of the realised marginal beneﬁt curve and will therefore retire the optimal amount
of permits. This assumption of perfect information is unrealistic in practice because the future
beneﬁts of pollution control are generally hard to evaluate for the regulator and also for the
victims of pollution. So, it is surprising that previous literature supposes beneﬁt certainty on
the citizens’ side because beneﬁt uncertainty is a common assumption in the literature. As
Stavins (1996) points out, “even a casual reading of the environmental economics and envi-
ronmental policy literatures will suggest that beneﬁt uncertainty is ubiquitous”. As Pindyck
(2007) also states, “(...) we never really know what the beneﬁts from reduced environmental
damage will be, (...). Worse yet, we can’t know with much precision what those beneﬁts will
be, even if we work very hard to ﬁnd out.” Furthermore, “more often than not, it is beneﬁt
uncertainty that seems to be of substantially greater magnitude” (Stavins 1996).
In general, environmental phenomena are identiﬁed but their exact consequences in the future
are subject to uncertainty due to the availability of scientiﬁc knowledge, stochastic conditions
7(temperature, wind speed, amount of water and water ﬂow speed, etc.) and also because we
do not know how humans will adapt (e.g., by changing eating habits, by building diﬀerent
houses or even by living in new areas)11. Thus, we do not see how citizens can be better
informed than the regulator and we may even consider that the environmental protection
agency generally has superior scientiﬁc knowledge compared with pollution victims. For
example, in the cases of climate change (greenhouse gas emissions) or even acid rain (SOx and
NOx emissions), everybody agrees with the fact that they are bad things but nobody can state
exactly how bad they are for the environment (health, land use, species, etc.) and economic
activity (agriculture, tourism, etc.). We acknowledge that citizens are better-informed than
the regulator about their willingness to pay for the environment, but the problem is that
citizens will generally reveal a willingness to pay for something about which they only have a
vague idea. It is also worth noting that environmental problems often involve very long time
scales (for instance, climate change, nuclear waste, extinction of a species) and irreversibility
eﬀects which exacerbate the beneﬁt uncertainty of pollution control.
Since in reality citizens’ decision regarding the quantity of pollution permits to be retired is
taken prior to the realisation of the damage, their willingness to pay for the environment has
to be determined in relation to an expected marginal beneﬁt function. Thus, citizens face the
same problem as the benevolent regulator and will purchase and destroy pollution permits
under uncertainty in order to maximize expected welfare. To understand the eﬀect of the
uncertainty citizens are faced with, we return to our set of simple diagrams presented above,
where MBC refers to the citizens’ expected marginal beneﬁt function.
In ﬁgure 1, if citizens know with certainty the true marginal beneﬁt function (MBR), citizen
participation in emissions trading allows the optimal level of pollution to be reached. If
citizens expect that the position of the marginal beneﬁt function MBC is between points B
and D, then citizens participation in emissions trading reduces or equals the initial welfare
loss resulting from the regulator error (notice that areas ABC and ADE are equal). If citizens’
expected marginal beneﬁt function is on the left of point B, they will not purchase and retire
permits. Finally, if citizens’ expected marginal beneﬁt function is on the right of point D,
citizens will purchase and retire so many permits that they increase the initial welfare loss.
This latter case is depicted in ﬁgure 1 where the additional welfare loss corresponds to the
area DFGE which can become extremely high for a marginal beneﬁt function shifting well
above point D.
In ﬁgure 2, we depict a case where citizens will theoretically not retire permits in Shrestha’s
analysis because the quota set by the regulator is higher than the optimal pollution level. In
addition, the initial welfare loss under price regulation is superior to the initial welfare loss
under quantity regulation. By applying the same reasoning as in ﬁgure 1, we see that for a
citizens’ expected marginal beneﬁt function MBC between points D and F, the initial welfare
loss under a quantity regulation rises. This increase can be such that it can exceed the initial
welfare loss obtained under an emission tax for a shift of the function above point F (notice
8that areas ABC and AFG are equal). This additional welfare loss is represented by the area
FHIG.
In ﬁgure 3, we show that our proposition still holds in the case of simultaneous uncertainty
in beneﬁts and costs previously examined by Stavins (1996). As explained above, citizen par-
ticipation can worsen the initial situation to the extent that the initial advantage of quantity
regulation above price regulation is reversed. Worse yet, the citizens’ expectation error can
in theory lead to unlimited welfare loss.
Given this, it appears that Shrestha’s proposition applies to a small number of particular cases
where pollution victims know with certainty the marginal beneﬁt of pollution control. Gener-
ally, these cases concern particular activities where the social costs do not depend on variables
beyond the control of those directly involved (polluters and pollution victims). Examples of
this are airport noise, olfactory nuisance or traﬃc congestion12, i.e. problems where pollution
victims are able to measure the real beneﬁt from pollution control precisely. But it is worth
noting that in reality, citizens can only fairly accurately measure the beneﬁt from pollution
control because we can always ﬁnd variables which are beyond the control of polluters and
citizens. For example, over a particular period, the wind direction can aﬀect the intensity of
olfactory nuisances and airport noise, or sunny days can aﬀect the nuisance arising from traﬃc
congestion. This remark also raises the problem of time, or more precisely, the problem of the
length of the compliance period. Indeed, if the compliance period includes several pollution
periods, action by citizens on the pollution permits market will not be suﬃcient to avoid hot
spots, even if citizens acquire critical information after the environmental target has been
set. For example, in cases of olfactory nuisance, a one month compliance period does not
allow citizens to reduce pollution externality during a week of unfavourable wind conditions.
Another example is the NOx Budget Program in California where the one year compliance
period does not avoid hot spots during hot summers.
In the following, we relax another assumption in Shrestha’s paper: the hypothesis of risk
neutral citizens. We show that the negative eﬀects on welfare of citizens’ expectation error
about the marginal beneﬁt can be reinforced if citizens also exhibit risk aversion.
4 Uncertainty at the citizen level and risk aversion
In this section, we consider that citizens are under uncertainty about the marginal beneﬁt
of pollution control and are also risk averse. Considering the peculiar nature of the good
being consumed by citizens (protection of the environment), it is reasonable to assume that
they may exhibit a certain degree of risk aversion13, for instance, regarding the severity of
the damage from pollution or even regarding the benevolent nature of the regulator. In this
theoretical setting, we show that citizens retire more permits under risk aversion than under
risk neutrality.
9Our ﬁnding is based on Sandmo’s seminal paper about the behaviour of a competitive risk
averse ﬁrm under price uncertainty (Sandmo 1971). In his paper, Sandmo demonstrates that
under uncertainty, a risk averse ﬁrm will produce output where the expected price of output
exceeds marginal cost (¯ p>C   (Q)). In other words, a risk averse ﬁrm produces less than
the expected proﬁt maximizing level. Our situation is the opposite of that of Sandmo, as it
concerns risk averse consumers who are under uncertainty about the marginal beneﬁt of their
consumption.
In compliance with the “prices vs. quantities” framework, we follow the standard convention
that goods are desirable and choose to talk about pollution abated (for instance, clean air or
pure water) rather than pollution emitted. Thus, we consider a commodity Q that can be
produced at cost C (Q) and yielding beneﬁt B (Q)w i t hC   (Q) > 0, B   (Q) < 0, B  (0) >
C  (0) and B  (Q) <C  (Q) if Q is suﬃciently large14. Citizens are assumed to be under
incomplete knowledge and uncertainty about the marginal beneﬁt of pollution reduction.
Assuming that citizens have a well-behaved standard Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility
function (U  > 0a n dU   < 0, concavity indicating risk aversion), they maximize their expected

















































































































From the deﬁnition of citizens’ welfare, we know that:
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< 0, the inequality sign
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> 0, we ﬁnally ﬁnd:




When marginal beneﬁts are stochastic, the ﬁrst-order condition implies that risk averse citizens
will not operate as under risk neutrality, where the permits price equals its expected marginal
beneﬁt, but where the permits price exceeds the expected marginal beneﬁt. This means that
when pollution victims exhibit risk aversion, they consume more emissions reductions than
under risk neutrality. In other words, citizens purchase and retire more permits under risk
aversion than under risk neutrality.
If we return to our set of diagrams presented above, risk aversion implies a shift to the right
of the citizens’ expected marginal beneﬁt curve. To illustrate this behavioural relationship
and in order to avoid adding another curve to these diagrams, we now suppose that MBC
depicts citizens’ behaviour under uncertainty and risk aversion. For example, if we assume
that citizens rely largely on the regulator’s expectation (MBE), citizens’ risk aversion about
the benevolent nature of the regulator or about the severity of the environmental and economic
eﬀects of pollution will lead citizens to retire an amount of permits deﬁned as QC − QE.I n
ﬁgure 1, if we assume that citizens’ expectation is correct (MBR), the eﬀects of risk aversion
11will lead citizens to retire permits beyond the optimal pollution level: QC − QE permits
and not Q∗ − QE permits as under risk neutrality. Thus, we see that depending on the
signiﬁcance of the citizens’ expectation error and on the degree of citizens’ risk aversion, the
curve MBC can sit below or above the optimal pollution level. Hence, it appears that the
citizens’ expectation error can be aggravated or ameliorated by the eﬀect of risk aversion.
Therefore, we can conclude that, under uncertainty and risk aversion, citizen participation in
pollution permits market can increase or decrease welfare level.
We can now add to the “prices versus quantities” debate by considering a situation in which
both citizens and ﬁrms are risk averse. In this theoretical setting, it appears that the regulator
cannot limit the eﬀects of ﬁrms’ risk aversion in the case of an emission tax (Adar and Griﬃn
1976); whereas he can control the negative eﬀects of citizens’ risk aversion by totally or
partially restricting the number of permits that citizens are able to purchase and retire from
the market.
5C o n c l u s i o n
When the quantity set by the regulator is too lenient, Shrestha (1998) argues that a pollution
permits market where pollution victims can buy and retire permits from the market will prove
superior to both standards and emissions tax regardless of the beneﬁt or cost uncertainty. In
agreement with this paper, subsequent literature extols the theoretical merits of citizen par-
ticipation in pollution permits market. In short, citizen participation in emissions trading
should always be considered because when non-polluting agents purchase and withhold emis-
sion rights, this means that the overall quota is not eﬃcient and therefore welfare gains will
be realised.
In this paper, we reconsider this policy recommendation, ﬁrst, by relaxing Shrestha’s assump-
tion of well-informed citizens about the future beneﬁts of pollution control; and second, by
introducing risk aversion into the analysis. Thus, we argue that citizen participation in pol-
lution permits market should be implemented cautiously. Indeed, when non-polluting players
purchase and withhold permits, this is not necessarily welfare-increasing.
Previous literature supposes that inﬂuences which lead to the purchase and withholding of
too few permits (free riding, the problem of the commons and the existence of transaction
costs) will prevail over the inﬂuence which leads to withholding too many permits (impurely
altruistic behaviours). In this paper, we identify two other inﬂuences which can lead to
pollution victims buying and retiring too many permits: beneﬁt uncertainty and risk aversion
on the citizens’ side. Given all these competing inﬂuences, it is diﬃcult to anticipate which
will prevail over. Intuitively, we can think that the ﬁrst three inﬂuences, especially free riding,
are likely to prevail over the other three inﬂuences. But there is no reason to assume that
this will be the case for all environmental problems. In theory, the range of situations in
12which citizen participation can increase the initial welfare loss is very wide. Allowing citizens
to retire as many permits as they wish can therefore be risky. As citizen participation has
certain merits (revelation of preferences); it seems preferable not to prohibit pollution victims
from buying and retiring permits but to put certain limits on the number of permits which
may be retired. More precisely, we propose that the regulator limit citizens’ action to a certain
number of permits, in order to maintain the possibility of getting closer to the optimal level of
pollution without risking high welfare loss. In addition, it seems important that the regulator
should help potential purchasers by providing more information.
Our results can therefore be summarised by the following points:
1. Citizen participation in pollution permits market should always be implemented without
restrictions on the number of permits which can be retired when pollution victims know
with certainty the marginal beneﬁt of pollution control.
2. Citizen participation in pollution permits market should be allowed with some restric-
tions on the number of permits which can be retired
(a) when citizens are also under uncertainty about the marginal beneﬁt of pollution
control;
(b) when citizens exhibit risk aversion.
3. A pollution permits market is superior to an emission tax when ﬁrms and citizens
exhibit risk aversion because:
(a) with an emission tax, the regulator cannot control the negative eﬀects of ﬁrms’
risk aversion on welfare;
(b) with a marketable permits system, the regulator can control the negative eﬀects
of citizens’ risk aversion on welfare by preventing or limiting citizen participation
in the trading process.
To determine (under uncertainty) the maximum number of permits that citizens can purchase
and retire, the regulator may for instance use as a basis the more stringent scientiﬁc scenario.
It is worth observing that the setting of this limit will inevitably play a part in the lobbying
game. We believe that this latter point could be an interesting topic for future research
in which the repetitive nature of tradable permits markets could be addressed. Indeed, for
environmental groups, buying and retiring permits reinforce their credibility when undertaking
a lobbying action to ask institutions for (in addition to the emission reduction percentage
which is already expected for the following exchange period) an overall quota reduction equal
to the number of quotas retired by citizens during the previous period.
Our current research project is to carry out an empirical study designed to assess the behaviour
of citizens in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. As citizens are not proactively
13participating in the trading process mainly because they are unaware of this opportunity and
because of high transaction costs, this empirical study relates more to their future behaviour.
Our objectives are summarized by the following questions: Do citizens think that the optimal
level of pollution has been set by the regulator? If not, what do they believe the optimal level
of pollution to be? Do they think that the signiﬁcance of their individual actions will be too
limited in relation to the problem in question (issue of the commons)? Will they choose to
free ride? If they think that they will buy and retire permits, what is their real motivation: do
they derive beneﬁt solely from emissions abatement or do they also obtain personal marginal
beneﬁts such as “warm-glow” (impurely altruistic behaviour)? And ﬁnally, what would be





































































Figure 3: Choice of policy instrument under simultaneous uncertainty
16Notes
1The “prices versus quantities” debate focuses solely on eﬃciency, assuming cost eﬀectiveness for
all pollution control approaches. For the sake of simplicity, we are only referring to tradable permits in
the rest of this paper when we speak about quantity-based environmental regulation. For an overview
of the economics of emissions trading, see Tietenberg (2006).
2In order to improve the readability of this paper, the expression “marginal cost” will refer to the
marginal pollution abatement cost, and the expression “marginal beneﬁt” will refer to the marginal
beneﬁt of pollution control.
3See Michaelowa and Butzengeiger (2005) for a general presentation of the European Union CO2
Emissions Trading Scheme.
4See Israel (2007) for a survey of American experiences on this topic and a complete analysis of
citizen participation in the U.S. Sulfur Allowance Auctions.
5The aim of carbon oﬀset programs is to gather a certain capital in the form of donations and to
develop emission reduction projects. Citizens participation in emissions trading diﬀers from carbon
oﬀsetting in that carbon oﬀsetting provides avoided pollution rather than actual abated pollution. The
avoided pollution notion refers to the project additionality issue as well as the organization in charge
of additionality veriﬁcation. See Rousse (2008) for a further discussion on this topic.
6Weitzman (1974) assumes that the random error characterising uncertainty is suﬃciently small to
justify quadratic approximations of total cost and total beneﬁt functions, i.e. linear approximations of
marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt functions.
7We will see later in this paper that beneﬁt uncertainty also plays a role in choice of optimal
instrument when citizens can purchase and withhold permits from the market in order to attain a
lower global pollution quota.
8For the sake of simplicity, we assume that permits are either auctioned in the competitive market or
grandfathered to polluting sources. We overlook the scenario in which environmental groups obtain the
entire initial allocation because of the real danger of monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviours. Notice
that the proposition of Ahlmein and Schneider (2002) to allocate permits free of charge to pollution
victims (each citizen receives an initial allocation) postpones the problem. Indeed, certain pollution
victims are likely to purchase and retire permits from the market if their initial allocation does not
match the damage they suﬀer. Moreover, in accordance with the works of Kahneman et al. (1990)
on endowment eﬀect, citizens may demand ﬁrms a higher price for the trade in permits to take place,
which results to a sub-optimal outcome.
9Dales (1968) admits that speculation in emissions trading has certain beneﬁts.
10To overcome this problem, Rousse (2008) proposes that the regulator or a foundation organise
citizen participation in pollution permits markets on a large scale in order to facilitate the citizens’
entry into the trading process. This type of system ﬁrstly involves gathering purchase demands for a
small amount of emission permits, then trading by bilateral agreement or on an exchange, and ﬁnally
withholding these permits from the market. In the case of climate change, we can envisage a website
through which citizens could purchase and cancel CO2 emission permits or other purchasing solutions
such as CO2 reduction tickets which would be available in post oﬃces or newsagents.
1711In the case of climate change, see Dessai and Hulme (2004) for a literature review.
12By traﬃc congestion, we are only considering in this instance time spent by traﬃc and not the
underlying problem of urban pollution from cars, whose damage is hard to determine.
13For the sake of simplicity, we assume in this analysis that the regulator is risk neutral; however,
regulator and citizens can clearly both be risk averse.
14The costs characteristics are only provided for illustrative purpose of the prices vs. quantities
framework and further graphical representations.
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